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INVESTMENT AND MANAGEMENT OF TRUST FUNDS
IN AN INFLATIONARY ECONOMY
Former French Premier, Paul Reynaud, termed inflation "legal-
ized robbery" 1 because, in his opinion, governments engineer it.
The "thief" strikes hardest at the purchasing power of those groups
with the greatest propensity to save 2 or with fixed incomes gener-
ated by accumulated savings.3 Generally, employed Americans are
protected through normal salary increases, 4 while workers covered
by escalation clauses gain additional protection as their wages
increase in direct proportion to increases in the cost of living.5 A
trustee charged with the management of a fixed sum, however, is
not as secure.6 Under the pressure of inflation, his position may
become unworkable due to the conflicting demands of the life
tenant 7 and the remainderman 8
This Comment examines the destructive effect of inflation upon
the traditional trust investments of bonds and common stocks and
demonstrates that the application of evolving investment theory
provides some protection against declining purchasing power,
through diversification into the speculative investment opportuni-
ties represented by precious metals and real estate. The Comment
also analyzes the trustee's legal position and demonstrates that his
responsiveness to the often conflicting interests of the life tenant
and remainderman is hampered by an inflexibly applied Prudent
IWormser, Adjusting Estate Planning to Inflation, in 3 INST. ON ESTATE
PLANNmnr 769.500 (P. Heckerling ed. 1969).
2 Savings represent deferred consumption becaume money saved currently could
have been spent on goods and services. By sacrificing the present enjoyment of
those things, the saver anticipates that he will be able to enjoy them at some point
in the future. Tim McGRAw-HIL DICTIONARY Os MODERN EcoNONcs 520 (2d
ed. 1973). During a period of rising prices, however, a dollar spent currently will
purchase more goods and services than one spent in the future. See id. 295.
Generally, the income generated by the savings will counteract this lost purchasing
power. To the extent that the earnings do not equal or exceed the increase in
prices, however, an individual is discouraged from saving.
3 See generally P. S~mUELsoN, EcoNoMIcs 272 (10th ed. 1976).
4 Torrance, Legal Background, Trends and Developments in the Investment of
Trust Funds, 17 LAw & CoNTEmponARY PhoBamns 128, 152 (1952).
rid.
6Id.
7 The life tenant, see note 132 infra, usually wants the maximum possible
income. This traditionally has meant investment in fixed income securities (e.g.
bonds), which are notoriously poor hedges against inflation.
8 A remainderman, see note 133 infra, wants the trust principal to increase.
Traditionally, those investments most prone to capital appreciation (e.g. growth
stocks) have provided low current income.
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Man Rule, the and-netting doctrine, and the judiciary's reluctance
to ease his burden by allowing modification of more restrictive
trust instruments. Finally, in addition to noting some counter-
vailing personal and tax considerations which tend to sustain the
viability of the trust mechanism in today's economic environment,
the Comment suggests that, in order to enable the trust to preserve
the purchasing power of the underlying capital, the Prudent Man
Rule should be read more flexibly, diversification into more specu-
lative investments should be considered, modification of trust
instruments should be made easier, and the draftsman should dis-
play creativity.
I. INFLATION AND INVESTMENT
A. Inflation and Return on Investment
Inflation may be defined simply as the erosion in purchasing
power of money in circulation. 9 Persistent inflation has plagued
the American economy since the end of World War II.10 Conse-
quently, every passing year witnesses a decline in the amount of
goods and services that a single dollar can command.11 This situa-
9 Professor Samuelson defines "inflation" as "a time of generally rising prices
for goods and factors of production .... ." P. SAmuEIsoN, supra note 3, at 270.
10 The average inflation rate since World War 11 has hovered between 3X% to
4% per annum. B. MArmL, A RT com WA.x DowN WAkL STmT 220 (college
ed. 1975). In 1973, the rate of inflation (measured by the increase in the consumer
price index) was 8.8%; it subsequently surged to 12.2% in 1974, but then slowed to
7% in 1975 and 4.8% in 1976. Elia, An Easing of Inflation--Or More Inflation-
Seen Hurting Stocks, Wall St. J., Sept. 27, 1977, at 20, col. 3. Based upon. one
monetarist model, the nation's fundamental (three-year) inflation rate is now close
to 7.1%. Busums WEEK, Oct. 24, 1977, at 21.
1" Between 1940 and 1976, the purchasing power of the dollar declined by.
more than 75%.
Purchasing Power of the Dollar
(Base Year 1967 = $1.00)
Purchasing Power
Year (Based on Consumer Price Index)
1940 $2.381
1945 1.855
1950 1.387
1955 1.247
1960 1.127
1965 1.058
1970 .860
1971 .824
1972 .798
1973 .752
1974 .678
1975 .621 1
1976 (May) .591
U.S. BurEAu or Trn CtNsus, DE,'T or CoMm =c STATaIsCAL ABsracr OF THE
UNrrxn STATES 1976, at 432 [hereinafter cited as STATISTCAL ABSTAncs].
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lion, however, is a relatively new phenomenon; prior to World
War I, periods of deflation 12 were as common as those of inflation.
13
Although there were major fluctuations in the price index in the
period 1776 through 1916, the increases offset the decreases so that
the net change was minor.14
Return on investment may be defined simply as the sum of
the current income and the capital appreciation of the investment.15
Any investor is, of course, vitally interested in the returns his in-
vestments generate. As long as the rate of inflation remained low
and decreases in the value of the dollar were offset by eventual
increases, income-oriented investors worried little about the pur-
chasing power of principal and instead focused their concern on the
production of current revenue. With the advent of persistent
inflation, however, formerly acceptable yields on investments be-
came inadequate because the revenue generated failed to counteract
the effects of inflation.' 0 Thus, while all investors needed to be
With an assumed inflation rate of 7%, see note 10 supra, and $100,000 in pur-
chasing power at the outset, it will take approximately ten years to destroy one-half
the principal's value:
End of Year Purchasing Power
1 $93,000
2 86,490
3 80,436
4 74,805
5 69,569
6 64,699
7 60,170
8 55,958
9 52,041
10 48,398
12 "Deflation" is defined as "a time when most prices and costs are falling."
P. SAmrELoN, supra note 3, at 270.
13 See Torrance, Legal Background, Trends, and Recent Developments in the
Investment of Trust Funds, 17 LAw & CoNTEMs-noARY PROBLEMis 128, 145 (1952).
The general price level in 1916 was the same as it was in 1776. Note, Prudence in
Trust Investment, 8 U. MicH. J. L. RF. 491, 505 (1975).
14 Note, supra note 13, at 505-06.
15 A. Gr'm, DicToxoARY oF EcONOMIC Tmnms 114 (1973). Capital apprecia-
tion is the increase in the market price of the investment itself. Examples include
an increase in the price of a common stock or a parcel of real estate. See Tim
McGnxw-Hum DiCTIoNAnY OF Monmus EcoNomics 25 (2d ed. 1973).
16 During the past 25 years, bonds generated the following yields:
1950 1974 1975
U.S. Government Bonds 2.32% 6.99% 6.98%
Corporate Bonds (Industrials, 40 bonds) 2.67% 8.78% 9.25%
Preferred Stocks (Standard & Poor's, 10 stocks) 3.85% 8.24% 8.36%
Common Stocks (Standard & Poor's, 500 stocks) 6.57% 4.47% 4.13%
STATSTICAL ABsTnAcT, supra note 11, at 495. In 1974, when the annual rate of
inflation reached 12.2%, see note 10 supra, none of these yields remotely replaced
the eroding purchasing power of the underlying principal.
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concerned with both the income and capital appreciation com-
ponents of return on investment, traditional investments such as
stocks '7 and bonds's were unable to supply a satisfactory total
return.19  As a consequence, the market values of portfolios-par-
ticularly those composed largely of bonds--dropped tremendously.
20
Because inflation reduces disposable personal income,21 its
effects are similar to those of taxes enacted directly by our legisla-
tures; 22 this "inflation tax" results in the consumption of capital.23
'7 In 1965, the Dow Jones Average for Industrials (30 stocks) stood at 910.88.
U.S. BUREAU OF EcoNoMIc AsA.LysIs, DEPT OF COMlMunCE, BusnEss STATISTCS,
1975 EDITION 107 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 1975 STATISTICS]. During the
period 1973-1974, when inflation reached 12.2%, the Dow Jones Average dropped
to a low of 577.60. Maabre, Analysts Say Decline in Market May Persist But See
No Recession, Wall St. J., Sept. 29, 1977, at 1, col. 1. This decline would have
been even more dramatic had it been adjusted for inflation.
18 An excellent illustration is long term (20 years), three percent United States
government bonds. The value of these bonds (per $100 bond) dropped from
$102.53 in 1950 to only $57.44 in 1975:
Year Dollar Value
1950 102.53
1955 103.36
1960 86.22
1965 83.76
1970 60.52
1975 57.44
STATISTICAL ABsRAcT, supra note 11, at 496. Previously, these bonds had been
considered a safe means of preserving capital while generating adequate income.
With the onset of inflation, however, these securities have proved an investment
disaster.
19 Introducing taxes into the equation further reduces the actual return. The
combined effect of inflation and taxes is confiscatory in operation. A simple example
best illustrates the result: Assume an average bond yielding 9.25%, see note 16 supra,
an inflation rate of 7%, see note 11 supra, and a conservative effective tax rate
(federal, state, and local) of 40%. The bondholder gains 5.55% after taxes (60% of
9.25%), but suffers a 7% loss on principal due to having held the bond for the year.
The loss offsets the gain and leaves the investor with a net loss of approximately
1.5% (measured in constant dollars). If the effects of taxes and inflation are
viewed together as one current tax on income, this example illustrates the equivalent
of a 116% rate of taxation: total levies (tax plus inflation) equal $10.70 ($3.70 +
$7.00); current income equals $9.25 (9.25% of $100); "tax rate" equals approxi-
mately 116% ($10.70/9.25).
2 0 Inflation necessarily leads to increases in the rate of interest as investors seek
increased income to compensate for the reduced value of their capital. Prices of
already issued bonds will decline until the interest paid yields the new, higher
market rate. Those who bought bonds when market interest rates were lower,
and thus paid a higher purchase price, will suffer a loss.
21 See note 19 supra.
2 2 To the extent that the activities of our representatives cause inflation, they
may be said to be levying a tax indirectly.
23 The example of a person who places his capital in a 5% passbook savings
account demonstrates this point. A 100% tax on the interest income when the
inflation rate is zero produces the same effect as a 5% annual inflation rate and no
tax. In both cases the saver is left with no real income. Whatever he spends
comes directly out of principal. Buffett, How Inflation Swindles the Equity Investor,
FoRT Nz, May 1977, at 260.
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The harmful effects are exacerbated by the introduction of the
progressive tax structure because higher tax rates are often triggered
by illusory increases in value. To the extent that these inflation
induced increases force the taxpayer into higher tax brackets, a
degree of confiscation exists. 2 -4 Furthermore, existence of the special
method of taxing capital gains which results in lower effective rates
only partially mitigates these harmful effects: to the extent that
gains are purely the consequence of inflation, there is no addition
to the taxpayer's real wealth or purchasing power and the applica-
tion of any method of taxation amounts to a consumption of
capital.
25
Over the past ten years, the combination of inflation and taxa-
tion has severely affected the performance of such investments as
bonds and common stocks. At the same time, tremendous new
opportunities have arisen, many of them somewhat speculative, in
the areas of precious metals and real estate investment. By combin-
ing conservative, income-oriented investments with speculative,
growth-oriented ones, the financially adept investor may arm himself
against the onslaught of inflation.
B. Investment Alternatives
I. Bonds
Because interest rates are fixed in contemplation of inflation,
bonds afford a hedge against the existing and expected rate of
inflation.20  If, however, the inflation rate unexpectedly increases
during the term of the bond, a corresponding rise in prevailing
interest rates will occur; consequently, the bondholder suffers a
decline in value of the bond as the market price drops to adjust the
yield to the level of the new interest rate.2-  Over the past twenty
24 Wormser, supra note 1, at ff 69.500.
25 Id. An investor may attempt to avoid the impact of taxes through the
purchase of tax exempt municipal bonds. Unfortunately, this would have provided
little protection against escalating prices. For example, at the height of inflation in
1974, these investments yielded only 6.26% (or roughly one-half the rate of price
increase). STATISTCA.L ABSTRACT, supra note 11, at 495.
26R. PosNER, EcoNomic AALYsLs oF LAw 197 (1972).
27 Id. Prices of previously issued bonds fluctuate inversely with the interest
rate. For example, a bond with a stated interest rate of 6% should sell at par when
the prevailing interest rate is 6% because an investor cannot obtain a greater return
elsewhere and usually will be unwilling to take less. If interest rates increase to
8%, however, an investor who purchases at that point will be unwillling to pay par
for the bond because his yield will only be 6% when he can get 8% elsewhere on
investments of comparable iisk. Thus, such an investor will buy the 6% bond only
at a discount. If the bond were perpetual, the discount off the face value would
equal the percentage of increase in the interest rate. (In the example above,
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years, the general trend has indicated a long-term increase in bond
yields.28 Thus, an investor who purchased bonds with the intention
of realizing long-term income has suffered actual losses, because the
annual interest has not adequately compensated him for the tying
up of his invested capital until the maturity date of the bond.
To some extent, however, bonds may be utilized as hedges
against inflation. Bond prices, like prices of common stocks, fluc-
tuate, although the fluctuations usually stem from changes in
interest rates rather than from the performance of corporate earn-
ings. 29 An investor may realize substantial gains by purchasing
bonds at times of high interest rates and selling them when the
rates decline.30 This type of transaction closely approximates spec-
ulation because the investor must forecast the direction of short
and intermediate term interest rates. Nevertheless, while the
general trend of increasing bond yields indicates that interest rates
have increased over the long-term, short-term interest rates have
fluctuated in both directions. Thus, modern investment strategy
dictates that a well balanced portfolio should contain some bonds
that are held for their appreciation potential and not simply for
the income they generate.
2. Common Stocks
Once described as "the most feasible vehicle for combating the
inroads of inflation," "I common stocks have since lost their attrac-
the discount would be 25%-(8%-6%)/8%). Because bonds typically have fixed
maturity dates, however, the discount off the face value will be smaller to com-
pensate for the fact that the holder will receive the higher face value at maturity
instead of his lower purchase price. The amount-of the discount (i.e., increase
in the fair market value of the bond) that results from the higher maturity value
decreases as the date of purchase approaches the date of maturity.
281975 STATisTcs, supra note 17, at 105. Bond yields by Moody's Rating:
Aaa Aa. A Baa
1947 2.61% 2.70% 2.87% 3.24%
1950 2.62 2.69 2.89 3.24
1955 3.06 3.16 3.24 3.53
1960 4.41 4.56 4.77 5.19
1965 4.49 4.57 4.63 4.87
1970 8.04 8.31 8.56 9.10
1974 8.57 8.67 9.16 9.50
29 This is a general rule. For example, the bonds of a corporation on the verge
of bankruptcy will trade at a heavy discount regardless of the interest rate.
30 See note 27 supra. During periods of declining interest rates, the fair
market value of bonds will increase. A gain would result on the difference between
the lower purchase and the new, higher market value if the investor sold his bonds
during such a period.
31 Note, Common Stocks in Trust, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 228, 259 (1964).
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tiveness. Like bonds, they have failed to perform well in an infla-
tionary environment.32 The reasons for their lackluster per-
formance are somewhat unclear. Because common stock represents
an equity interest in a company's assets, inflation directly increases
the underlying asset value of all stocks. Thus, it would be reason-
able to expect that an informed investing public would recognize
the increase in underlying asset value and bid up the price of the
shares.33 However, this analysis overlooks the fact that underlying
asset value, like book value, rarely plays a major role in setting the
market price of shares of stock. 4 These values are only important
when the corporation is liquidated; because going concerns are
rarely liquidated in inflationary times, however, stockholders seldom
gain access to these inflating assets.3 5 Furthermore,
because the corporation's assets are combined in a busi-
ness enterprise, the investment public appraises such
factors as the general economic climate, the outlook for the
particular industry, the company's competitive position,
and the ability of its management, and arrives at a valua-
tion for the stock which may differ materially from the
sum of the assets.86
Therefore, although the fluctuation of underlying asset value has
some relevance for estimating earning power and liquidation value,
it exerts little influence on investor activity. Consequently, other
factors must explain the dismal performance of common stocks.
Several explanations have been offered for the generally poor
performance of common stocks during periods of rapidly increasing
prices. First, it has been suggested that, in an economic sense,
stocks have come to resemble bonds.37 According to the conven-
tional wisdom, the return on equity investments fluctuates from
year to year while the returns on particular bond issues temain
fixed. Nevertheless, review of the recent history of corporate
earnings discloses that returns on book value have stabilized at
22 Buffett, supra note 23, at 250.
33 See id.; Note, supra note 31, at 229.
3 4 T. HOLT, ToTAL INMVTMG 53 (1976).
351d.
36 Note, supra note 31, at 229.
37 Buffett, supra note 23, at 250.
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approximately twelve percent.8  Thus, common stock earnings,
much like bond yields, have become fairly constant. The crucial
difference, however, is that as the rate of inflation changes, bond
yields respond to this change either with concomitant variations in
interest rates on newly issued bonds or fluctuations in the fair
market values of outstanding issues.89 As a result, investors are
confronted with a choice between investing in equities-the returns
on which are tied to corporate earnings and which, on a percentage
basis, are unresponsive to inflation-or bonds, which have interest
rates that do reflect fluctuations in the rate of inflation. Because
long-term trends have evinced increasing rates of inflation and cor-
responding escalations in bond yields,40 investors have generally
chosen to purchase bonds instead of stocks and have liquidated
their equity holdings in the process. This selling of stocks in order
to buy bonds in turn triggers declines in the stock market. The
higher the inflation rate, the more generous bond yields become 41
and the lower stock prices sink as they fall under increased selling
pressure. Furthermore, common stocks will continue to suffer as
long as the rate of return on equity investment remains relatively
constant.
The effect of constant inflation on the general economic climate
reinforces the decline in stock prices. As inflation threatens busi-
ness profits and investors fear declines in corporate earnings due to
anticipated government policies such as restrictive fiscal and mone-
tary programs, common stock prices drop.42 The general attitude
of the securities markets turns "sour" and investors concentrate
on lower risk forms of investment; stock prices drop until their
returns, both in the form of dividend yield and potential capital
appreciation, rise to levels which induce investors to hold or pur-
chase securities.
48
Although price levels are constantly rising, the rate of price
escalation fluctuates.44 At various times price increases taper off,
causing the previously stated explanation of poor overall stock per-
38 Id.
39 See note 27 supra.
4o See note 28 supra & accompanying text.
41 See note 16 supra.
42B. MALmxx, supra note 10, at 221.
43Id. 221-22.
44 See notes 10-11 supra.
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formance to reverse itself in the short run.45 At that point, stocks
become attractive, and opportunities to make real profits 46 from
intermediate and short term trading arise. Such activities tend
toward speculation, however, and consequently may not be under-
taken by the more conservative investor. According to modern
investment doctrine, which contemplates such theories as covariance
and risk analysis, 47 such restraint is counterproductive. It must be
remembered, however, that regardless of the existence of sophisti-
cated theory, stock market prediction remains an inexact pursuit.
This is best illustrated by professional fiduciaries who, even when
given wide investment discretion, generally have not performed as
well as the standard indices. 48 In addition, both in terms of
purchasing power and absolute dollar amounts, the market itself
has performed poorly over the past dozen years.49 The promise of
common stocks remains unfulfilled; yet, without question, they
merit a place in every balanced portfolio. 0
3. Precious Metals
In 1974, the price of gold was deregulated and the prohibition
against ownership of gold by American citizens was rescinded.5 1
For more than thirty years prior to 1974, the official valuation of
gold had been $35.00 per ounce. 52 Once the price of this precious
metal was free to find its own level in the competitive market,
however, it soared, reaching its peak at the same time inflation did
in December, 1974.13  As the rate of growth in the price level
moderated, so did the price of gold.54 Although gold has increased
45 See notes 37-41 supra & accompanying text.
46 Real profits may be defined as gains in purchasing power, not simply in-
creased dollar yield. See D. MoFFAT, EcoNo~Ncs DictnoN nY 231 (1976).
47 See text accompanying notes 72-77 infra.
4 8 Langbein & Posner, Market Funds and Trust Investment Law II, 1977 A.B.F.
Es. I. 1, 2-3.
49 See note 17 supra.
5 0 See text accompanying notes 72-77 infra.
51 Exec. Order No. 11825, 3A C.F.R. 206 (1974), reprinted in 12 U.S.C.
§ 95a (Supp. V 1975).
5 2 Thomas, Gold Recovery: More Investors are Switching Out of Paper Money,
BArnoN's, April 11, 1977, at 5.
5 3 The price of gold rose to a high of $197.50 per ounce in December, 1974.
Id. Inflation reached a peak of 12.2% that same year. See note 11 supra.
54 By August, 1976, the price of gold had declined to $103.50 per ounce.
See Thomas, supra note 52, at 5. The price subsequently rebounded to $175.25
in February, 1978. N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1978, at 31, col. 4 (Afternoon fixing,
London).
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in value approximately 500 percent since 1974,5t much of this ex-
traordinary price increase can be attributed to the one-time removal
of official restraints. Nevertheless, after the abatement of this
initial reaction to Americans' newly-accorded right to own gold,
opportunities to make substantial profits on dealings in gold have
continued to exist in the free market.5 6 Similarly, the price of
silver has shown steady advancement each year,57 although its in-
crease has not been as spectacular as the increase in the price of
gold. 8
The market values of gold and silver have more than kept pace
with inflation. Yet, for all their attractiveness in terms of capital
appreciation, both are characterized by three major drawbacks.
First, their prices are subject to marked fluctuations, 9 which fact
categorizes them as speculative investments. Second, neither metal
produces any current income as compared to bonds, which generate
interest, or stocks, which generate dividends. This characteristic
is likely to displease the investor interested in high current income
from his portfolio. Third, the ownership of these assets may in-
volve a negative present return because storage costs must be paid
currently if the metals are warehoused, or, if actual delivery is
55 The price of gold on Feb. 4, 1978 was $175.25, approximately five times
the prior official price of $35 per ounce.
56 Since August, 1976, the price of gold has increased steadily at a healthy
rate. See note 54 supra. Furthermore, short term increases have also been good.
For example, the price of gold recently increased by 8% in a little more than 3
months from $162.90 to $175.25. Compare Wall St. J., Oct. 27, 1977, at 38, col. 6
(Afternoon fixing, London) with N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1978, at 31, col. 4 (Afternoon
fixing, London).
57
Year Dollars per fine oz.
1947 0.718
1950 0.742
1955 0.891
1960 0.914
1965 1.293
1970 1.771
1974 4.708
1975 STATiS-TCS, supra note 17, at 100.
In 1977, the price reached $4.877 per ounce. Wall St. J., Oct. 27, 1977, at
38, col. 6. It subsequently increased to $5.001 per ounce in the following three
months. Wall St. J., Jan. 27, 1978, at 20, col. 5.
5 8 Because no comparable restrictions against Americans owning silver existed,
the large increase in the price of silver between 1971 and 1974 cannot be attributed
to deregulation.
59For example, the price of gold increased from $112.50 to $197.50 per
ounce in 1974. Thomas, supra note 52, at 5.'
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taken, it may be necessary to incur assay costs to determine purity
before resale. 60 Although these drawbacks present some hazards,
the potential for capital appreciation cannot be ignored. Thus, in
light of modem portfolio strategy, a prudent investor would no
doubt be justified in investing some portion of his capital in
precious metals. They represent a rational opportunity to preserve
some current purchasing power for future generations.
4. Real Estate
Real estate, both in the form of undeveloped land and im-
proved land with buildings, has proven to be an excellent hedge
against inflation.6' Although prices have not been as volatile as
those of gold and silver, real estate investment does involve some
hazards. Liquidity can be a major problem, both in finding a
buyer and then arranging the necessary financing. This procedure,
which can be both time consuming and expensive, may force an
investor who needs immediate cash either to do without it or sell
at distress prices.
During a period of rising prices, the attractiveness of the real
estate leads to problems of its own. As the prospect of capital
appreciation lures ever increasing numbers of the investing public,
rents tend to fall behind as real estate values surge upward in
60 The investor can avoid assay costs if he holds the metals in the form of
coins. The best example of a widely available gold coin is the South African
Krugerrand, which contains one ounce of fine gold. Because the coin is currently
being minted, numismatic value is limited; thus, the investor confines his risk solely
to the value of gold. American silver coins that predate the introduction of the
"sandwich" (copper in the middle) in the mid-1960's are traded on the futures
market with quotes per $1,000.00 (face value) bag listed daily in the Wall Street
Journal,
6 The Department of Commerce composite construction cost index reflects the
impact of inflation upon construction:
(1967 = 100)
1947 54.0
1950 62.1
1955 72.6
1960 83.1
1965 92.7
1970 120.1
1974 173.0
1975 STAuSxics, supra note 17, at 54. As might be expected, the largest jump
occurred between 1970 and 1974, when inflation reached its peak. Because new
construction competes with existing buildings, the above index gives a good indica-
tion of the direction of the entire market.
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response to the- increased demand.62 The combination of low rent
and high potential capital appreciation is tolerable because the net
effect is an attractive total return.63 Nevertheless, because costs may
rise rapidly as rents, remain low, a real estate investor may suffer a
current cash shortage while the value of his assets is increasing. 4
This not only makes~the cost of maintaining the investment bur-
densome, but is likely to dissatisfy the income-oriented investor as
the cash available for distribution tends to be small or nonexistent.
65
In addition, tenant-occupied properties, particularly apartments,
generally require close supervision, either by the investor directly
or by his agent. In either case, the costs reduce profits and exacer-
bate any existing cash shortage. Overall, real estate management
can entail responsibilities and risks which require abilities beyond
those of individual investors.
It was at one time suggested that a lack of expertise in property
management could be obviated by the use of the Real Estate Invest-
ment Trust (PELT).66 By purchasing shares in a REIT, an in-
vestor theoretically could participate in the profits attendant upon
real estate investment without having to shoulder direct responsi-
bility for the management of the property. Furthermore, because
the shares were publicly traded, the problem of liquidity would also
be solved. Of course, the RELT managers would receive compen-
sation; however, these costs were expected to be reasonable in an
advancing market. Unfortunately,. because of weak underlying in-
vestments, 67 the market for REIT's faltered when the stock market
did, and both REIT share prices and dividend payouts fell pre-
62 Laden, The Impact of Influrton on the Investor, 114 TRusTs & EsTATEs 22,
24 (1975). The National Association of Home Builders recently estimated: "Rentals
. . . may be one of the last remaining bargains. The 1976 median rent for new
apartments was $215 a month, only 13% higher than the $190 figure of 1973. In
the same period the overall cost of living rose 28% and apartment construction costs
soared 32%." Wall St. J., Sept. 21, 1977, at 1, col. 6.
63 Laden, supra note 62, at 24.
64 Id.
65 On the other hand, the investor who desires capital appreciation rather than
current income will be very satisfied. -
66 Note, supra note 31, at 242 n.67.
67 BElTs overreacted during the boom years between 1969 and 1973 when
they and their lenders funneled "money into the hands of developers who were
busy, in turn, putting up every kind oE development, from condominiums in Florida
svamps to office parks in New York boondocks." The market eventually became
glutted and collapsed. The New Money Tardet: Profitable Real Estate, BusiNuss
Wmx, Aug. 1, 1977, at 52.
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cipitously. 8 Consequently, investors interested in either current
income or long-term appreciation were injured by investments in
REIT shares despite the tremendous increase in real estate values
during the same period.0 Thus, as with so many other new invest-
ment vehicles, the promise that REITs were once thought to hold
has proven to be largely illusory.
Despite the difficulties attendant upon ownership of real estate,
it remains a potentially excellent hedge against inflation. The
caveat is, of course, that it requires capable management on the
part of the investor. A reasonable man would be well advised to
place some portion of his portfolio into real estate in order to
effect the extremely important diversity of investments that modern
theory has shown to be so crucial.
5. Mutual Funds
A mutual fund involves the pooling of investors' cash in a
common fund to be invested in the market by professional man-
agers. In this way, the investor with limited resources can enjoy
the benefits of diversified holdings and gain the services of profes-
sionals.70 If the money managers were at all times equal to the
task, the mutual fund would be an excellent vehicle by which small
and intermediate-sized investors could participate in the stock
market. A review of professionally managed funds, however, re-
veals that, on the whole, their investment performance has been
worse than that of the personal fund of the amateur investor. Fur-
thermore, when the costs of management and administration are
included, it is discovered that professionally managed funds have
done worse than the broad market averages, such as the Standard
and Poor's 500.71
68 The National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts stock price index
stood at 100 in January, 1972, but dropped to 16.87 in December, 1974. By July,
1976, the index had recovered less than four points to 20.60. NAOTAL Asso-
CIATION OF REAL ESTATE INVESTmENT TRUSTS, BEIT FACT BOOK 37 (1976)
[hereinafter referred to as BElT FACT BooK]. Total dividends paid were
$155,260,523. in October through December 1973, falling to $29,652,268. in
October through December 1975 (81% decrease), while the number of BElTs
paying dividends fell from 140 to 48 in the same period (65% decrease). Id. 35.
69 See note 61 supra. While real estate values were rising, the value of BEIT
assets was actually falling. In 1974, BEITs held assets of approximately $21.2
billion; in 1975, the value had declined to $19.4 billion. BElT FACT BOox, supra
note 68, at 103.
7 0 See Lobell, The Mutual Fund: A Structural Analysis, 47 VA. L. REV. 181,
182-86 (1961).
71 Langbein & Posner, supra note 48, at 2.
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Investors following the conventional wisdom have long ap-
proved mutual funds. As in the case of other investments, however,
inflation and changing economic environment have caused a redefi-
nition of rational and prudent investment behavior. In view of
the poor performance of professional managers, the mutual fund.
experience may very well prove that there is no substitute for the
reasonably astute individual investor, for only he can devote the
attention necessary to review each investment within his diversified.
portfolio. Larger professional funds cannot afford the costs in-
volved in the management of a number of smaller, highly diverse,
investments. In light of the poor performance of mutual funds,
the small to medium-sized investor will probably be more successful
on his own than as part of a large fund.
C. Investment Strategy
In the last few decades, investment strategy or portfolio theory
has undergone something of a revolution.72  The emergence of risk
analysis and covariance theory underscores the need for flexible
investing 7 3 Current investment strategy looks not only "to indi-
vidual securities, but also [to] portfolio risk." 74 Based upon co-
variance theory, an investor should select a balance of various in-
vestments, because this results in the reduction of overall risk to
the portfolio. 5 A prudent investor is interested in the maximum
return from his total portfolio given a specified degree of risk.7
Moderate speculation therefore is rational, particularly when invest-
ment risk also includes loss of purchasing power from inflation.
By diversifying and mixing speculative with conservative invest-
ments, the investor increases the likelihood of securing gains which
offset, or at least partially mitigate, the effects of inflation.
72 See Bines, Modern Portfolio Theory and Investment Management Lawr
Refinement of Legal Doctrine, 76 CoLur. L. REv. 721, 734-35 (1976); Note,
Trustee Investment Powers: Imprudent Application of the Prudent Man Rule, 50".
NoaE DAmm LAw. 519 (1975); Note, supra note 13, at 508.
73 See generally Note, supra note 13, at 524-25.
74 Id. 509. The author explains that: 'Portfolio risk is dependent upon the.
correlation or covariance among the individual investments, as well as the risk of
each component. In other words, the risk of an investment as a part of a portfolio
is related to the covariance of that investment with other investments in the
portfolio." Id. (footnotes omitted).
75 See id. 509-10; Bines, supra note 72, at 794-95.
76 Note, supra note 13, at 509.
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Application of current portfolio theory to the previously dis-
cussed investment alternatives strongly recommends the use of more
than just the traditional bonds and "blue chip" common stocks. A
diversified portfolio should contain some speculative bonds, com-
mon stocks, precious metals, and real estate. A prudent investor
should not commit himself to any one form of investment, but
should spread the risk among various forms of investment on the
theory that the economic events that might cause the price of one
to fall would prompt another to increase. 77 Therefore, although
particular assets may be individually speculative, the total risk of
the entire portfolio is reduced by choosing investments with risks
that complement each other.
In the area of trust investment, the law has been slow to
recognize this shift in portfolio management theory. The law
remains tied to principles that were developed during the nine-
teenth century, when large, regulated securities markets did not
exist and the level of understanding of economic problems was
much less sophisticated. Current events require the application of
the new theories, because past prudent behavior is no longer ra-
tional in the prevailing investment environment. The old notions
of safety which entailed heavy reliance on the use of bonds and
"blue chip" stocks must be discarded and replaced by the concepts
of moderate speculation and risk spreading. Armed with this "new"
strategy, the investor has a better chance of preserving market power
and generating an acceptable level of income.
II. Tim PROBLEMS OF THE TRUST AND THE TRUSTEE
IN AN INFLATIONARY ECONOMY
The typical trust 78 is administered by a trustee who holds legal
title to specified property (the res or corpus) and is charged with
77 Covariance between stocks has been illustrated as follows: Company A, an
automobile manufacturer, earns its best profits (and enjoys its highest stock market
price) when the gross national product (GNP) is rising. Company B, a printer
of food stamps for the government, reaps its greatest profits (and enjoys its best
stock price) when the GNP decreases. These two stocks are said to covary
negatively. By purchasing both, the investor decreases the overall risk of the
portfolio: when the GNP is falling and Company A is suffering, Company B is
booming; conversely, when GNP rises, A does well while B does not. A risk-
limiting balance has been struck. Id. 510.
78 Numerous types of trusts exist. See BLcK's LAw DicrioNAY 1680-82
(rev. 4th ed. 1968); E. CLArur L. Lusxy , & A. MupHy, GRATunous TRANsFERS
434 (2d ed. 1977). This Comment, however, is concerned only with express trusts.
Express trusts are defined as trusts "created or declared in express terms, and
usually in writing, as distinguished from one inferred by the law from the conduct
or dealings of the parties." BLAcac's LAw DicEioNARY 1681 (rev. 4th ed. 1968)
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its management for the enrichment of certain beneficiaries39 Most
trusts are managed by institutions-generally banks-which oversee
the investment policy and administration of the trust in exchange
for a fee.80 These managers are generally cautious in their invest-
ments, an entirely understandable approach for anyone charged
with the care of someone else's money. This caution has been
encouraged by the law, which holds the fiduciary liable for failure
to exercise proper care in the discharge of his duties.8 '
The diligent manager may wish to alter his traditional invest-
ment policy, however, to take account of the effects of inflation on
the value of the trust-and, in most cases, he should.8 2  Unfor-
(citations omitted). Depending upon the reason for their existence, private express
trusts may be placed into one of two categories: caretaker or dynastic. Friedman,
The Dynastic Trust, 73 YALE L.J. 547 (1964). Caretaker trusts usually have an
abbreviated term and are designed to safeguard the interests of specific beneficiaries.
Rigid safeguards protecting principal may be necessary in order to guarantee their
availability for designated purposes. Id. 551. The objective of a dynastic trust
is the maintenance of the estate; thus, dynastic trusts are designed for the maximum
duration allowed by the Rule Against Perpetuities. Id. 547-49; see Leach, Per-
petuities in a Nutshell, 51 HtAv. L. REv. 638 (1938).
79 E. CLAnK, L. LusKY, & A. MunPHIy, supra note 200, at 433.
80 This fee is generally a considerable sum and usually draws from both income
(a percentage) and principal (a set sum per thousand dollars of corpus). The cost
of a fiduciary thus constitutes a further threat to the real value of a trust. In one
sense the rewards of managing a trust justify a stricter attitude towards -trustees.
It is no longer possible to agree with Lord Hardwicke's view:
If there is no mala fides,-nothing willful in the conduct of the trustee, the
Court will always favour him. For as a trust .... if faithfully discharged,
is attended with no small degree of trouble, and anxiety, it is an act of
great kindness in any one to accept it. to add hazard or risque to that
trouble, and to subject a trustee to losses which he could not foresee, and
consequently not prevent, would be a manifest hardship, and would be
deterring every one from accepting so necessary an office.
Knight v. Earl of Plymouth, 1 Dickens 120, 126-27 (1747). Whatever the increase
in rewards trusteeship might justify in terms of accountability of trustees, it certainly
entitles the beneficiaries to diligent, attentive, and activist investment strategy,
which is, after all, what they are paying for. As fees rise, it seems only fair that
beneficiaries should expect more from their managers, and that the law should
encourage increased activism.
81 See, e.g., In re Estate of Rothko, 84 Misc. 2d 830, 379 N.Y.S.2d 923 (Sur.
Ct. 1975), modified, 56 App. Div. 2d 499, 392 N.Y.S.2d 870 (1977); In re Bond
& Mortgage Guarantee Co., 303 N.Y. 423, 103 N.E.2d 721 (1952); In re Hubbell,
302 N.Y. 246, 97 N.E.2d 888 (1951); C. BoGEBT, TRusTs & TRusrzss §§ 701-08
(2d ed. 1960); 3 A. ScoTT, TE LAw O'F TRusTs §§ 205-12 (3d ed. 1967).
82 The necessity of adjusting investment policy will largely depend upon
whether the trust is a caretaker trust or a dynastic trust. See note 78 supra. Infla-
tion needs time in order to work its destruction. Because a caretaker trust is
usually designed to endure only for a short period, the potential for inflation damage
to the corpus is limited. As a consequence, the potential appreciation available
from an aggressive investment program is probably not worth the risk of endangering
the beneficiary's inheritance. See Friedman, supra note 78, at 551. In contrast,
the dynastic trust is designed to last for much longer periods. Thus, administrative
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tunately, any effort to do so presents the manager with a dilemma:
a more aggressive investment policy may well be in the best interests
of the beneficiaries whose interests he guards, but, because of the
"protection" afforded the beneficiaries by the law, the manager
himself may be liable for any losses sustained by a more speculative
series of investments. This is a consequence of the law's failure to
recognize that the economy has undergone fundamental structural
changes such that nineteenth century rules are no longer applicable
to twentieth century portfolio management. Given the impact of
inflation, legal attitudes must change to take into account the
various problems confronting the modern trustee. First, courts
must relax some of the standards applied to fiduciaries generally.
Second, courts must be ready to modify overly restrictive clauses in
existing trust instruments if they threaten the underlying purposes
of the trust, which purposes generally include the preservation of
principal. Third, courts must strike a new balance, when necessary,
to protect the interests of the income beneficiary, as well as those
of the remainderman. A more flexible legal attitude in these areas
will probably not compensate for all the losses resulting from infla-
tion, because many managers may have no desire to change their
own investment policy. Nevertheless, the law should not do harm,
even if it is unable to solve the problem completely.
A. The Legal Standard
Historically the law has regulated fiduciaries in one of two
ways. One system, the "legal list," allows investments only in those
securities placed on the official list by the legislature.8 3 The fidu-
ciary is thus assured that an unsuccessful investment will not result
in a surcharge, as it was specifically approved by the legislature.
The list system originated in England,84 and was adopted by many
flexibility is a necessity because rigid rules of investment policy that are unable to
adjust to changing market conditions will minimize the effectiveness of the invest-
ment manager assigned the task of preserving the purchasing power of the trust. Id.
83 Statutory lists may be either permissive or mandatory. If permissive, invest-
ments made outside the list may be allowed if the investor can prove reasonable
care and skill. If mandatory, even prudent investments are thought to be breaches
of trust. See, e.g., Note, The Reform of the Prudent Investor Rule, 24 MEucEa
L. R -. 513, 514-15 (1973). Typically the lists exclude investment in common
stock. R. PosNaa, supra note 26, at 197.
84 Note, supra note 83, at 514.
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states, including Pennsylvania.85 Recently, however, these states
have been abandoning the list system in favor of the alternative
"prudent man" approach 86
The Prudent Man Rule was first enunciated in 1850 by Mr.
justice Putnam of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in
Harvard College v. Amory: 7
All that can be required of a trustee to invest, is, that
he shall conduct himself faithfully and exercise a sound
discretion. He is to observe how men of prudence, discre-
don and intelligence manage their own affairs, not in
regard to speculation, but in regard to the permanent dis-
position of their funds, considering the probable income,
as well as the probable safety of the capital to be invested. 8s
The Rule as stated is remarkably flexible. As the court noted: "Do
what you will; the capital is at hazard." 89 Any investment includes
risk; the taking of these risks is a matter of "prudence, discretion
and intelligence." What risks are worth taking vary with changing
economic circumstances. The court did note that investments
should not be made "in regard to speculation," but in an economic
climate in which continued growth is necessary if the invested
capital is to keep its purchasing power, men of prudence, intelli-
gence and discretion might well be expected to make some growth-
oriented, somewhat risky investments-not in regard to speculation,
but in regard to preservation of real value.
However flexible the original rule may have been, it has been
interpreted more narrowly. The New York decision, King v.
Talbot,90 is perhaps the best known:
T]he trustee is bound to employ such diligence and such
prudence in the care and management, as in general, pru-
85Act of February 18, 1824, P.L. 25, cited in Stewart, Legal Investments and
the Prudent Man in Pennsylvania: A Study of Evolving Concepts, 37 TtMPr L.Q.
121, 122 n.3 (1964). For many years, New York maintained an intermediate
position, permitting half of the portfolio to be in common stock and the rest to be
controlled by the legal list. E. CLAnx, L. Lusxy, & A. MunPY, supra note 78, at
782.
86 This has been the case in Pennsylvania and New York. PA. CoNs. STAT.
ANN. tit. 20, § 7302 (Purdon 1975); N.Y. EsT., PowEis & TnusTs LAw § 11-2.2
(a)(1) (McKinney Supp. 1977).
8726 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446 (1830).
88 Id. 461.
SO d.
9040 N.Y. 76 (1869).
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dent men of discretion and intelligence in such matters
employ in their own like affairs.
This necessarily excludes all speculation, all invest-
ments to an uncertain and doubtful rise in the market .....
It, therefore, does not follow, that because prudent
men may, and often do, conduct their own affairs with the
hope of growing rich, and therein take the hazard of
adventures which they deem hopeful, trustees may do the
same; the preservation of the fund, and the procurement
of a just income therefrom, are primary objects of the
creation of the trust itself, and are to be primarily re-
garded.91
Although this attitude may have been reasonable in 1869,92 in the
current era, in which "preservation of the fund" requires consider-
able growth in dollars, the blanket prohibition on speculation is
far too broad. Nonetheless, this decision, and others like it,93 com-
prise the majority view of what constitutes a "prudent man."
A more sensible attitude is to scrutinize the reasons for - an
investment decision at the time it is made. Even conservative-
investments may later prove unwise, and courts have generally
absolved the fiduciary of any liability if he can demonstrate con-
siderable care in the selection of the investment.94 But a prudent
fiduciary may also exercise intelligence and disretion in the decision
to make investments in more hazardous securities. In fact, if he-
balances his choice of risk carefully, the overall risk in the portfolio
may decline. 5 If the Prudent Man Rule is to serve the interests of
the beneficiaries, it must allow those who invest for them to take
the same measures to counteract loss of purchasing power that pru-
dent men would take in managing their own affairs. Today such
investments do not represent gambles made "in the hope of grow-
ing rich," but rather prudent risks designed to keep pace with the-
growth, real or imagined, of the economy at large. Such invest-
91 Id. 85-86 (footnote omitted).
92 See note 13 supra & accompanying text.
93 See, e.g., In re Carnelrs Will, 21 N.Y.S.2d 376, 379, 260 App. Div. 287,
aff'd, 284 N.Y. 624, 29 N.E.2d 935 (1940); In re Hirsch's Estate, 116 App. Div.
367, 101 N.Y.S. 893, 899 (1906), aff'd, 188 N.Y. 584, 81 N.E. 1165 (1907); In re-,
Stumpp's Estate, 153 Misc. 92, 274 N.Y.S. 466 (Sur. Ct 1934).
94 Courts have emphasized the importance of research and review of each
investment. See, e.g., In -'e Pate's Estate, 84 N.Y.S.2d 853 (Sur. Ct. 1948), af'd,
276 App. Div. 1008, 95 N.Y.S.2d 903 (1950); Fisher Trust, 26 Pa. Fiduciary -Rep.
276 (Orphans' C. Montg. Co. 1976); Estate of Simon, 24 Pa. Fiduciary Rep. 599
(Orphans' C. Erie Co. 1974).
95 See Note, supra note 13, at 509-10; notes 72-77 supra & accompanying text,
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ments do not constitute "speculation" in the sense understood by
nineteenth century courts; rather they serve as useful tools in the
prudent, and, indeed, conservative, management of an entire port-
folio. When a fiduciary can demonstrate that his decisions were
not ill considered or poorly informed, but, instead, were made with
an understanding of the risks involved and as part of an overall
investment strategy designed to protect the real value of the trust
principal, he should not be held liable by the courts for ultimately
unsuccessful investments.
The unfortunate consequences of a narrow reading of what
constitutes a "prudent man" can also be seen in the related concept
that every investment must be judged separately.96 Thus a fiduciary
who invests in three speculative securities, and realizes gains on two,
but a loss on one, may be surcharged for the one loss, despite the
overall success of his investment policy. This rule is called the
"anti-netting" doctrine, because it bars the fiduciary from netting
his gains on profitable investments against losses on other invest-
ments. 97  Coupled with an inflexibly applied prudent man
standard, this rule puts great pressure on fiduciaries to concentrate
their investments in well known securities, the prudence of which
have already been tested. This is not likely to be in the best
interests of the beneficiaries, who are more interested in the overall
performance of the fund than in the wisdom of any particular
investment.
The anti-netting doctrine may also have unfavorable tax conse-
quences. 98 Penalizing a trustee for individual losses encourages him
to retain a security after its market value has been impaired, rather
than to admit openly, through a sale, that an investment error was
made.99 For tax purposes, these losses remain unrecognized, where
they could otherwise have been used to offset capital gains and
9 6 See, e.g., G. BoranT, supra note 81, § 708; A. ScoT, supra note 81, § 213.
New York provides particularly vivid examples, e.g., In re Bank of New York, 35
N.Y.2d 512, 517, 323 N.E.2d 700, 703, 364 N.Y.S.2d 164, 168 (1974); In re
Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., 89 Misc. 2d 1088, 1091-93, 396 N.Y.S.2d 781, 784-85
(Sur. Ct. 1977).
97 See, e.g., Creed v. McAleer, 275 Mass. 353, 362-63, 175 N.E. 761, 762-63
(1931); Vest v. Bialson, 365 Mo. 1103, 1117, 293 S.W.2d 369, 379 (1956); State
ex rel. Bottcher v. Barling, 149 Neb. 491, 500-01, 31 N.W.2d 422, 428 (1948);
Pennsylvania Co. for Ins. on Lives v. Gillmore, 142 N.J. Eq. 27, 47, 59 A.2d 24, 37
(1948).
98 Note, supra note 72, at 528.
99 It should also be noted that continuing to hold a security that has little hope
of regaining its former value is a very poor means of allocating resources. Trustees
should be encouraged to accept their losses and transfer remaining funds to new
investments that promise appreciation.
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reduce the trust's overall tax.1 ° In an age of heavy taxation, even
a loss can have a significant dollar value; the law should not inhibit
its recognition. Thus, by admitting a broader definition of the
prudent man, and by being ready to judge a fiduciary's performance
as a whole rather than investment by investment, courts can en-
courage managers of trusts to adopt more aggressive investment
policies.
B. Ameliorating the Negative Effects of the Trust Mechanism
Even if the legal standard applied to fiduciaries is relaxed to
accommodate investment strategies attuned to the dynamics of an
inflationary economy, the fiduciary may ultimately be frustrated by
the trust document itself. Many trust instruments were drafted in
response to a prior, different, set of economic conditions. Experi-
ences such as the stock market crash of 1929, and, earlier, the defla-
tionary period following the Civil War, led many settlors to assume
that any form of speculation should be avoided. Thus, although
currently drafted instruments generally permit investment of trust
funds in common stock, trust instruments forbidding this invest-
ment are relatively common. 01 Under present economic condi-
tions, however, these restrictions do not protect the real value of
the trust principal, -02 but instead make any efforts to do so virtually
impossible.
These restrictions involve difficult legal questions as well as
economic problems. Courts are naturally wary of countermanding
the specific instructions of a settlor, but it is reasonable to expect
that courts will give effect to the settlor's intent even if faultily
expressed.103 In this context, however, intent may have several
100 I.R.C. §§ 1201, 1211, 1212. To "recognize" a loss the security must be
sold or exchanged. I.R.C. §§ 1001, 1002.
101 See, e.g., the trust instruments of issue in In re Brown's Estate, 408 Pa.
214, 183 A.2d 307 (1962), In re Jeffries" Estate, 393 Pa. 523, 143 A.2d 391 (1958),
In re Kelsey's Estate, 393 Pa. 513, 143 A.2d 42 (1958), In re Copes Estate, 351
Pa. 514, 41 A.2d 617 (1945).
102 See text accompanying notes 72-77 supra.
103 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has stated:
In order to ascertain the actual intent of the settlor or testator, the Court
must place itself in his armchair and consider not only the language and
scheme of the instrument but also the facts and circumstances with which
he was surrounded; and these surrounding facts and circumstances include
the condition of his family, the natural objects of his bounty and the
amount and character of his property.
In re Trust Estate of Pew, 411 Pa. 96, 107, 191 A.2d 399, 405 (1963) (citations
omitted).
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meanings, each of which would lead a court to a different conclu.
sion. An instrument that forbids the fiduciary's investing in cbm-:
mon stock manifests a clear intent to forbid that specific method of-
investment. The settlor can not be said to have been confused:
about the meaning of his words, and he no doubt included them in
the instrument for a purpose. In a literal sense, he intended to
disallow investment in common stock for the duration of the trust-
On the other hand, the settlor also intended to protect the-
value of the principal. 04 His decision to exclude investment in-
common stock rested on a judgment that the risks of the market
were a threat to the value of his holdings and that steps should be.
taken to guard against any threat to that value. Given the economic,
conditions with which the settlor was familiar, this cautious policy-
made some sense. He could not have foreseen the widespread,.
continuous high rates of inflation that have existed since World-
War II. Because inflation has proved to be a most dangerous threat
to the value of assets held in trust, the -courts, by giving effect to
the settlor's command forbidding growth-oriented investment, have,
guaranteed the frustration of his underlying intent to preserve the.
value of the corpus.
Although it is clear that courts may alter express provisions of-
a trust instrument under certain circumstances, 0 5 difficulties arise
in determining what those circumstances are. 0 6 One of the most
important questions in modem trust law is whether the onset of-
104 This statement may not be true in every instance. For example, a settlor
who lived through the Great Depression and saw some stockholders lose everything
when the market crashed in 1929 might have been so fearful of losing everything
at once that he would prefer to allow the value of the principal to diminish slowly
because of inflation rather than invest in stock and see part of the corpus become-
worthless overnight Nevertheless, as increased government regulation has made-
the chance of another crash remote while present fiscal policies tolerate persistent
inflation, investors have become more apprehensive of the destructive power of'
inflation and more concerned with protecting the purchasing power of trust
principal.
06 G. BoGERT, supra note 81, § 561; 2 A. ScoTT, supra note 81, § 161. For
example, modification is thought justified when the authorized securities have be--
come unavailable or impossible to obtain. In re Vogler's Trust, 66 D. & C.2d 552,
24 Pa. Fiduciary Rep. 400 (1974).
106 Modification usually is not granted simply because the court thought it was;
,desirable:
Courts cannot, even when aided by hindsight and the ingenuity of counsel,
rewrite a settlor's deed or a testator's will, or distort or torture his lan-
guage or the language of a statute relating thereto, in order to attain what
we believe is beneficial and wise, or even what we believe settlor would
or should have provided if he had possessed a knowledge of all presently
existing circumstances.
In re Kelsey's Estate, 393 Pa. 513, 519, 143 A.2d 42, 45 (1958).
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inflation is a proper circumstance justifying modification. The
leading case in the movement towards adoption of the position that
inflation is a proper circumstance is In re Trusteeship Under Agree-
ment with Mayo.lor The grantor created two separate trusts, one
in 1917 and another in 1919, and died in 1939, just prior to the
onset of the current period of inflation. In substance, both trusts
limited investments to "real estate mortgages, municipal bonds or
any other form of income bearing property (but not real estate nor
corporate stock)." 10s The beneficiaries and trustees sought modi-
fication of these terms in order to permit investment in com-
mon stocks. Relying on evidence that, after the donor's
death, inflation "had reduced the real value of the trust assets
by more than 50 percent . . . [and] that a further inflationary
period or a permanent 'creeping inflation,' which the donor could
not have foreseen, must be expected. ," 109 the court ordered the
requested modification and decided that "unless deviation is ordered
the dominant intention of the donor to prevent a loss of the princi-
pal of the two trusts will be frustrated." 110 Given current eco-
nomic conditions, this kind of reasoning should prevail because it
recognizes the damage that inflation can cause and that rigid ad-
herence to the grantor's original instructions may actually defeat his
intent. Some cases following Mayo have accepted this reasoning and
allowed changes in the trust instruments.1
Regrettably, many courts are not as farsighted. A substantial
body of case law rejects the proposition that inflation constitutes a
threat sufficient to justify judicial modification of a trust instru-
ment. 12 In direct contrast to Mayo is Stanton v. Wells Fargo Bank
ir Union Trust Co.,"1 3 in which the court reviewed an instrument
that limited the trustee to investment in bonds possessing a rating
specified by a certain investors' service. Taking a classically inflex-
107 259 Minn. 91, 105 N.W.2d 900 (1960).
108 Id. at 92-93, 105 N.W.2d at 902 (emphasis in original).
109 Id. at 93, 105 N.W.2d at 902.
11o Id. at 97, 105 N.W.2d at 904.
ill Carlick v. Keiler, 375 S.W.2d 397 (Ky. App. 1964); Troost Ave. Cemetery
Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 409 S.W.2d 632, 636 (Mo. 1966); cf. Davison v. Duke
Univ., 282 N.C. 676, 194 S.E.2d 761 (1973) (the court expressed doubt that the
threat of destruction of the dominant purposes of a trust by the ravages of inflation
would be insufficient to warrant modification of the trust instrument).
112 Stanton v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., 150 Cal. App. 2d 763,
310 P.2d 1010 (1957); Toledo Trust Co. v. Toledo Hospital, 174 Ohio St. 124,
187 N.E.2d 36 (1962). See Thomson v. Union Nat'l Bank, 291 S.W.2d 178 (Mo.
1956); Reiner v. Fidelity Union Trust Co., 127 N.J. Eq. 377, 13 A.2d 291 (1940).
113 150 Cal. App. 2d 763, 310 P.2d 1010 (1957).
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ible position, the court rejected modification based upon declining
purchasing power, and commented:
No emergency exists. The existing inflationary cycle has
continued for some years. The government has adopted
many economic measures to try to control and stop this
inflationary trend. Some economists predict an era of de-
flation and others warn us of a depression. These matters
are mentioned to indicate that, while the settlor may not
have been omniscient, neither are the beneficiaries nor the
courts, omniscient." 4
The movement towards the Mayo position is apparent in
Pennsylvania. Since 1967, the Commonwealth has allowed modifi-
cation of a trust instrument at the court's discretion if the court is
satisfied "that the original purpose of the testator or settlor cannot
be carried out, or is impractical of fulfillment, and that the author-
ized release will more nearly approximate the intention of the
testator or settlor." 115 An amendment clarified any difference that
may have existed between the grounds for modification in the
statute and Mayo. The statute now permits modification if the
court finds "that the existing or reasonably foreseeable economic
conditions are so far different from those prevailing at the creation
of the trust that adherence to the restriction might deprive the
respective beneficiaries of income and principal of the full benefits
the testator or settlor intended them to enjoy." 116 The court's power
to override even express instructions in the trust instrument "under
proper circumstances" is generally conceded. 117 The Pennsylvania
Act is an eloquent observation that changing economic circum-
stances constitute just such a "proper circumstance." 11 As such, it
"-4 Id. at 771, 310 P.2d at 1016.
115 PA. STAT. A NTN. tit. 20 § 7319(b) (Purdon 1972) (amended 1974), cited in
Comment, The Power of the Trustee in Pennsylvania to Deviate From the Invest-
ment Provisions of the Trust Instrument, 77 DIc-K. L. REV. 614, 617 (1973).
16 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. tit. 20 §7319(b) (Purdon 1975) (as amended
1974).
117 2 A. ScotT, supra note 81, at § 167.
118 "This statute is legislative recognition of the well settled doctrine that an
orphans' court has the power to order deviation from the express terms of a trust
should the circumstances dictate such deviation in order to carry out the purposes
of the trust." In re Stewart Memorial Fund, 22 Pa. Fiduciary Rep. 212, 217 (1971)
(citations omitted). See, RE sTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF TRusTs §§ 167, 381 (1959).
"It is believed that these statutes are in most cases merely declaratory of the
existence of a power which the court has as a part of its general equitable juris-
diction." G. BoGr=, supra note 81, at § 561.
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should be applied to pre-existing trust instruments and not confined
to those drafted after its enactment." 9
Although the previous suggestions are useful in solving the
problems of an existing trust, careful drafting of the instrument is
the optimal solution. If the settlor has confidence in the trustee,
his attorney should set forth wide powers of discretion in the in-
vestment clause, in order that the best interests of the beneficiaries
may be served without the necessity of reference to the cumbersome
restraints embodied in the Prudent Man Rule.120  So that the
grantor's intention is perfectly clear, it may be best to specifically
authorize a wide and not exclusive range of investment choices. 121
Of course, any deviation from the Prudent Man Rule merits settlor-
trustee discussion prior to the establishment of the trust.122 In that
way, the fiduciary will be apprised of the settlor's expectations
before he assumes responsibility for the trust assets.
The grantor who desires a flexible or particularly aggressive
investment program should consider appointing an individual
trustee who is more aware of the grantor's objectives than an insti-
tutional fiduciary.12  In view of the poor performance of the large,
professionally managed funds,124 a capable individual could reason-
ably be expected to do no worse, and logic suggests that he may well
119 Given the traditional conception of a court's broad equitable power to
enforce trusts, there should be no difculty in applying the Pennsylvania Legislature's
definition of "appropriate circumstances for modification" to trust instruments already
existing before the 1974 amendment. The court has always possessed the power
to modify, although its use has been confined by judicial discretion. Legislative
encouragement to modify in changed economic circumstances creates no new power
but serves only to encourage the court in the use of that power. As such, it should
raise no question of illegal "retroactive" application.
This issue merits attention only because of the unduly restrictive attitude
adopted towards § 18 of the Investments Act by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
cases such as In re Estate of Brown, 408 Pa. 214, 183 A.2d 307 (1962) and In re
Kelsey's Estate, 393 Pa. 513, 143 A.2d 42 (1958). Although these opinions darkly
mentioned a retroactivity problem, both assumed that § 18 was legal but refused to
construe the language of the instruments involved to allow more aggressive invest-
ment. Whatever the merit of these decisions, neither refused to apply § 18 to
pre-existing instruments and neither dealt with modification at all. A fiduciary
desiring a more aggressive policy might well face a surcharge under these decisions
if he sought a more liberal interpretation of the instrument, but they are inapplicable
should he ask the court for modification of the instrument. The exact language of
an instrument, of course, is unimportant vhen modification, not interpretation, is
the goal.
12o Burch & Hemmerling, Estate Planning in an Inflationary Economy, 27 S.
CAL. TAx INsT., 489, 535 (1975).
121 Id. 535-36.
122 Id.
123 Id. 537.
12 4 See text accompanying note 71 supra.
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do better because he can devote more personal attention to each
asset held in the trust. A large bank or trust company with thou-
sands of trust funds to administer is, on the other hand, forced to
deal with each fund on a more impersonal basis. 125 Furthermore,
the large institutions generally are conservative and, therefore,
would probably not act as aggressively as the grantor intended even
if accorded the suggested broad investment powers. Hence, an
individual trustee may prove to be a valuable asset in the trust's
battle against inflation.
It is imperative that the grant of investment discretion in the
trust instrument be clear and explicit. Courts are generally reluc-
tant to allow variations in the terms of the trust instrument unless
extreme or completely unexpected circumstances arise that would
impair or defeat the purpose of the trust.12 6 The power to deviate
is cautiously guarded; 127 "[it] is not permitted solely to increase
the beneficiary's income, aid one beneficiary at the expense of an-
other, or merely because it would be beneficial to the trust." 128
The Prudent Man Rule can be avoided, 2 9 but the language must
be clear,130 or courts may interpret an investment clause narrowly
and find no power to make "nonlegal" investments.' 3 '
C. Balancing the Interests of the Life Tenant and the Remainderman
A trustee's problems in managing a trust corpus in an infla-
tionary economy are compounded if the beneficiaries do not have
similar interests in the trust. For example, a trustee may be re-
125 See generally Herman & Safanda, Allocating Investment Information,
FnANcr-L ANrxiYss J., Jan./Feb., 1973, 23, 27-28.
126 Comment, The Problem of Selecting and Drafting an Investment Clause for
a Trust, 44 NEB. L. Rzv. 109, 119 (1965).
127 Id.
128Id. at 119-20 (footnotes omitted). See In re Trusteeship Under Will of
Whelan, 263 Minn. 476, 116 N.W.2d 811 (1962), in which the court that decided
Mayo refused to find that unforeseen economic conditions authorized the court
to vary the beneficial rights contained in a trust instrument. The court would not
exercise its equity power to increase the interests of the life tenant to the detriment
of the remainderman (the income beneficiaries wished to increase the amount of
the annuities payable to them under the will).
129 See generally In re Clark's Will, 257 N.Y. 132, 177 N.E. 397, 398 (1931):
"The testator had an absolute right to provide that his trustee should not be liable
for losses accruing from the retention of securities, although it may have been
imprudent so to retain them." (citation omitted).
130 The Problem of Selecting and Drafting an Investment Clause for a 'Trust,
supra note 126, at 125.
is, Id. 125-27.
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.quired to pay out the income to a life tenant 13 and hold the prin-
cipal for a remainderman. 133 This division of interests between
successive beneficiaries may lead to a conflict stemming from the
life tenants desire to receive maximum income currently and the
remainderman's wish to see the corpus grow, regardless of the
income consequences. In an effort to preserve capital in an infla-
tionary period, however, the trustee must focus increasingly on
investments that display the greatest promise of appreciation. Were
he freed from the necessity of balancing the beneficiaries' conflicting
interests, he would accept greater risks and the possibility of a lower
income level. Any emphasis upon capital appreciation which de-
emphasizes current income 134 may constitute a breach of his duty
of impartiality to the life tenant and the remainderman. The trustee
thus finds himself compelled to develop a strategy that pursues both
a respectable income stream and the preservation of corpus purchas-
ing power.135
The law provides very little guidance beyond vague generaliza-
tions such as: "If a trust is created for beneficiaries in succession,
the trustee is under a duty to the successive beneficiaries to act with
due regard to their respective interests." 136 Review of existing case
132M. RA nq, LAw DianoNARY 191 (2d ed. 1970) defines a life tenant as:
"A person who has the right to enjoy certain property for a period measured by his
life or that of another named person."
133 Id. 291. A remainderman is "[olne who is the owner of an interest or
estate in remainder . . ." Remainder is defined as: "The part of an estate in
land which by grant will begin when a particular, i.e., a more limited estate, created
at the same time and by the same grant, is terminated." Id.
134 The situation is best illustrated in the case of a growth stock that pays
a small dividend and retains its earnings in order to finance additional corporate
expansion. Xerox, for instance, paid a dividend of only $1.60 per share, yielding
3.7% on a market price of $43.75. Wall St. J., Jan. 27, 1978, at 27, col. 3.
13I David, Principal and Income-Obsolete Concepts, 43 PA. B.A.Q. 247, 249
(1972).
136 RESTATjEmNT (SrcoxD) oF TRUsTs § 232 (1959). The accompanying
comment adds little to clarify the meaning intended:
Although the trustee is not under a duty to the beneficiary entitled to the
income to endanger the safety of the principal in order to produce a large
income, he is under a duty to him not to sacrifice income for the purpose
of increasing the value of the principal. Thus, the trustee is under a duty
to a life beneficiary not to purchase or retain unproductive property or
property which yields an income substantially lower than that which is
normally earned by trust investments, although it is probable that the
property will appreciate in value ....
On the other hand, the trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary who
is ultimately entitled to the principal not to purchase or retain property
which is certain or likely to depreciate in value although the property
yields a large income, unless he makes adequate provision for amortizing
the depreciation.
Id., Comment b.
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law contributes little more in the way of a concrete standard against
which a trustee may measure his conduct with respect to the inter-
ests of the life tenant and the remainderman13 7 What is certain,
however, is that some effort must be made to protect the benefi-
ciaries' separate interests. 138
A number of approaches can be taken to accommodate the
interests of the different beneficiaries. Regardless of the method
chosen, the important act is the realization that, as a consequence
of inflation, a clash of interests must occur between the successive
beneficiaries of the trust. Because the grantor or testator is, of
course, free to specify a desired division of income and principal
among the prospective beneficiaries as well as a desired investment
policy, the most helpful solutions may be realized in the drafting
of the trust instrument itself. Several proposals for use in designing
the trust document are currently available to the creative draftsman.
The first utilizes the concept of the unitrust-a combination of "the
original principal, capital gains and income into a single fund." 130
The trust document would specify that the life tenant is to receive
a fixed percentage "of the current market value of the combined
fund." 140 Because the value of the fund presumably will fluctuate
in response to changes in the purchasing power of the dollar, the
income beneficiary should receive some protection against inflation.
The choice of an appropriate percentage will involve hazards
intrinsic to any projection of adequacy based upon predicted eco-
nomic conditions. However, the unitrust has the advantage of
insulating the life tenant from the risks inherent in any alternative
method that would give the trustee discretion to determine the
income rate based upon investments made.
141
A second proposal is based upon "floating apportionment": '"
The proportions of the fund considered income and principal
"float" depending upon the inflation rate and growth rate of the
trust portfolio. To the extent that there is capital appreciation in
excess of the prevailing rate of inflation, the income beneficiary will
13 7 See Pennsylvania Co. v. Gillmore, 137 N.J. Eq. 51, 58-59, 43 A.2d 667,
672 (1945); In re Thompson's Estate, 262 Pa. 278, 281, 105 A. 273 (1918); In re
Flinn's Estate, 83 Prrr. LEG. J. 131, 131 (1934), aff'd, 320 Pa. 15, 181 A. 492
(1935).
138 See In re Estate of Stillman, 81 Misc. 2d 747, 366 N.Y.S.2d 934, 940
(1975); N.Y. EsT., PowERs & TRUSTS LAiv § 11-2.1(a)(1) (McKinney 1967).
139 David, supra note 135, at 251.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Comment, Trust Allocation Doctrine and Corporate Stock: The Law Must
Respond to Economics, 50 TEXAS L. REv. 747, 771 (1972).
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share in the gains.143 In this way, the life tenant will receive
increasing income and the remainderman's future interest in the
purchasing power of corpus will be preserved. Theoretically, each
will receive protection from inflation without damage to the interests
of the other, as might occur if the trustee initiates a high income/
low growth plan or high growth/low income approach.
Finally, a grantor particularly concerned with the purchasing
power of the life tenant may tie current payments to the Consumer
Price Index 14 or permit the trustee broad powers to invade princi-
pal for the support and maintenance of the income beneficiary.146
Depending upon the growth rate of the principal, however, this
approach may impair the remainderman's interest, which may be
acceptable if the settlor is more concerned about the life tenant than
the succeeding beneficiaries.
Any of these three methods has the advantage of giving the
trustee flexibility to match his investment policy to the prevailing
economic conditions without injuring the divergent interests of the
various beneficiaries. If deflation occurs, he can pursue the goal of
high income without impairing the purchasing power of principal.
Conversely, in time of inflation, he can stress growth without lower-
ing the current income of the life tenant.
A trust instrument that is not carefully drafted to guide the
trustee in balancing the interests of the different beneficiaries makes
the trustee's task much more difficult in the current inflationary
environment. Nevertheless, a large number of existing trust instru-
ments pose such a problem for their trustees. In these instances, a
logical approach for the investment manager is diversification of the
portfolio.148 By purchasing high yield stocks and bonds and growth-
oriented, somewhat more speculative investments, a trustee can
balance the life tenant's desire for income and the remainderman's
interest in the future value of the principal. 47 Unfortunately, this
143Id. 771-79. The author illustrates with the following facts: Begin with a
4% inflation rate (based upon the consumer price index) and a 7% growth rate of
the trust portfolio. Assume $100,000 was originally invested in common stocks
paying a 3% dividend. At the end of the first year the "floating principal" would
rise to $104,000 (4% inflation rate applied to $100,000 principal). That would
leave $3,000 in "extra" appreciation: ($100,000 (principal) x 7% (growth rate)) -
$104,000 ("floating principal") = $3,000. The income beneficiary would receive
a total of $6,000 ($100,000 x 3% dividend rate plus $3,000 "extra" appreciation).
The above facts are a simplified illustration of the "floating apportionment" scheme;
the actual situation is, of course, complicated by such factors as fluctuating growth,
inflation rates, and income taxes.
144 See Burch & Hemmerling, supra note 120, at 529-30.
146 See id. 538-39.
146 See Comment, supra note 142, at 767.
147 Id.
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does not provide the final solution; the trustee must still determine
what the appropriate mix should be in a given instance to provide
the "proper" return to each beneficiary. Ideally, the overall return
on the trust corpus would provide both a "fair" rate of return
for the life tenant as well as reasonable maintenance of purchasing
power for the remainderman. If this standard proves to be unwork-
able, however, a rough notion of equality between the different
beneficiaries will prevail in most cases; 148 alternatively, other situa-
tions may call for favoring one beneficiary over another.14 9 This
analysis, however, provides no guidance to the trustee in determin-
ing what total return he should attempt to realize and what level of
risk is acceptable. Furthermore, the trustee's problems are com-
pounded because he must also determine what constitutes a "fair"
rate of return to the life tenant. The trustee must evaluate these
considerations and then diversify the portfolio accordingly. Thus,
a trustee would welcome as much guidance as possible from the
trust instrument in order to simplify his decisionmaking and
insulate him from liability to a dissatisfied beneficiary.
D. Countervailing Considerations
The above survey of the traditional trust investments (bonds
and "blue chip" common stocks) reveals their failure to maintain
purchasing power in an inflationary period. Diversification and
risk spreading among more speculative stock and bond issues,
precious metals, and real estate offer some protection, but these
countermeasures by no means guarantee successful preservation of
purchasing power. Furthermore, strait-jacket fiduciary standards
make difficult the adoption of whatever partial solutions have been
devised. In short, trusts and trustees are confronted by an ex-
ceptionally hostile investment environment.Although a grantor may realize that the commitment of assets
to a trust will result in the erosion of their long term value, various
personal or tax reasons may still make it advantageous for him to
use this legal device. Such personal considerations may include an
incompetent, infirm, or spendthrift beneficiary. For example, a
parent may feel that none of his children has the requisite interest
148 If the overall return on principal is insufficient to satisfy both the life
ten'ant and remainderman, the deficiency should be shared equally by both bene-
-llciaries; conversely, if the portfolio return exceeds what is necessary to satisfy both
demands, the excess should be divided equally.
149For example, a testator may create a trust that gives a life interest to his
surviving spouse and remainder to his children. In that instance, the testator may
be more concerned with ensuring an adequate income for the support of his sur-
-viving spouse than with the amount his children ultimately receive.
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or ability to manage large amounts of capital. By restricting access
to these assets for at least one generation, he may insure that the
basic needs of his offspring will always be met. Furthermore, the
grantor may wish to protect his child from a potentially disastrous
marriage. By making his child the income beneficiary of a trust,
the grantor may prevent an improvident spouse from wasting the
capital he bequeathed. Thus, the trust provides a mechanism for
safeguarding family assets despite the mistakes that individual mem-
bers may make in their personal lives.
The desire to minimize estate taxes may also lead to use of the
trust mechanism to accomplish generation-skipping transfers. 50
Under current federal estate tax law, assets are, as a general rule,
subjected to a levy based upon their market value at the date of
death.1'5 In the simple case, the parent leaves everything to the
child who, in turn, leaves everything to the grandchild, and so on.
At each death, a tax is imposed on the value of the assets transferred
to the next generation.152 Through the trust, however, the tax on
the middle generation may be skipped or at least mitigated.153 If,
however, most or all of the assets escape taxation at the child's death,
these tax savings may offset the losses suffered through inflation.
VI. CONCLUSION
Since the Second World War the value of the dollar has fallen
tremendously.'5 4 Those sections of the economy dependent upon
accumulated savings find that the returns generated are inadequate,
and, when the effects of inflation and taxation are considered, that
invested capital is actually consumed. Due to the nature of the
assets of which they are composed; trusts can be particularly vulner-
15oA detailed discussion of generating skipping transfers is beyond the scope
of this article. For a closer examination, particularly in view of the changes made
by the 1976 Tax Reform Act, see Dodge, Generation-Skipping -Transfers After the
Tax Reform Act of 1976, 125 U. PA. L. BEv. 1265 (1977); LR.C. §§ 2601-22.
'51 I.R.C. §§ 2001, 2031, 2051.
152I.P C. § 2001.
153I.R.C. §2613(b)(6) (up to $250,000. distributed to grandchildren of the
grantor is excluded from the tax).
The mechanics of generation skipping may be illustrated simply: Parent creates
a trust to receive assets upon his death; his child is named the life tenant and his
grandchild the remainderman. At the child's death, the income interest would
expire and, prior to 1976, leave nothing in the child's estate to be valued for tax
purposes. Since the Tax Reform Act of 1976, however, some portion of the trust
may be subject to tax at the time of the child's death. Dodge, supra note 106, at
1265.
154 Based upon the consumer price index (1967 = 100), prices were:
1947 66.9 1975 STrrxsncs, supra note 17, at 41.
1977 (Sept.) 184.0 Busn-Ess WEEK, Nov. 7, 1977, at 2.
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able to the combined attack of inflation and taxation. This, in
turn, places the trustee in a most difficult position: he finds himself
restricted by the generally inflexible Prudent Man Rule, the anti-
netting doctrine, courts unwilling to grant modification to existing
trust instruments, and the requirement that he engage in a difficult
balancing of interests between the life tenant and remainderman.
These rigid standards, coupled with the poor performance of tradi-
tional trust investments, have left trusts crippled, and have deprived
many beneficiaries of part of the value of their inheritance. The
economic harm has been so extensive that grantors should analyze
all alternatives before committing assets to long term trusts. When
it is decided that personal or tax considerations justify the creation
of a trust, a number of steps must be taken to minimize the damage
that inflation may cause. These steps include a more flexible read-
ing of the Prudent Man Rule, trust portfolio diversification, liberal
modification of trust instruments, and the inclusion of broad invest-
ment powers in newly created trusts. All may provide some degree
of shelter from inflation, particularly in the case of a short-term
trust.
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